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[S8.(I. No. 7611. In Bank. Sept. 6, 1966.] 
Estate of PETER BAGLIONE, Deceased. MARIE BAGLI. 
ONE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERT L. WAGNER, 
as Executor, etc., et at, Defendants and Respondents. 
[Sac. No. 7646. In Bank. Sept. 6, 1966.] 
MARIE BAGLIONE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERT 
L. WAGNER, as Executor, etc., Defendant and Re-
spondent; CARMELLO BAGLIONE et aI., Interveners 
and Respondents. 
(Two Cases.) 
[1] Husband and Wif~Property-What Constitutes Community 
and Separate Property.-A finding that real property held by 
a husband and wife was community property, despite the fact 
that they took title originally under a joint tenancy deed, was 
supported by their pleadings in a subsequent divorce action in . 
which each of them alleged that the property was community 
property. 
[2a,2b] Decedents' Estates-Appeal-Harmless Error.-A probate 
court, having detennined that a widow was entitled to at least 
her community share of estate real property in dispute, should 
also have determined any other interests she had in the same 
property under an alleged agreement that on the death of 
either spouse all property accumulated during the marriage 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Community Property, § 75; Am.Jur.2d, Com-
munity Property, § 70. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 34; [2] De-
cedents' Estates, § 1128; [3,4] Decedents' Estates, § 32; [5] Courts, 
§ 160; Decedents' Estates, § 19; [6] Frauds, Statute of, § 36; [7] 
Frauds, Statute of, § 59(2) • 
....... -- . - - .-
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would go to the survivor, but failure to make such determina-
tion was harmless error where the court, in a subsequent 
action, correctly concluded that the widow's claim under the 
agreement was barred by the statute of frauds. 
[3] Id. - Jurisdiction Over Matters of Administration - Contro-
versies With Third Persons.-The jurisdiction of superior 
courts sitting in probate to administer decedents' estates 
generally does not encompass power to pass upon assertions of 
title to property by parties who are not in privity with the 
estate but are claiming adversely to it. 
[4] Id. - Jurisdiction Ovez' Matters of Administration - Contro-
versies With Third Persons.-Exceptions to the rule that 
probate courts do not have power to pass on adverse claims 
by parties not in privity with the estate appear when a 
controversy has been held to have a sufficient connection with 
a pending probate proceeding to be properly litigated therein; 
8uch connection may arise out of the relationship between the 
parties, or out of the nature of the claim to the property, or 
may be based upon any additional claims that a party asserting 
a substantive right in a particular piece of property or in 
certain assets as an heir, legatee, or devisee may assert against 
those in privity with the estate in the same property. 
[li] Courts-Superior Court-Jurisdiction: Decedents' Estates-
Jurisdiction-Superior Courts.-In the exercise of its legal and 
equitable powers, a superior court sitting in probate that has 
jurisdiction over one aspect of a claim to certain property ca n 
determine all aspects of the claim, and a claimant is n/lt 
required to sever and litigate a multi-faceted claim in separate 
proceedings once all the necessary parties are before the 
court. (Disapproving statements to the contrary in Sieroty v. 
Silve,., 58 Ca1.2d 799 [26 Cal.Rptr. 635, 376 P.2d 563], and 
Smith v. Smith~ 220 Cal.App.2d 30 [33 Cal.Rptr. 559].) 
[6l Frauds, Statute of-Agreements for Leasing or Sale of Real 
Property - Contracts Involved. - Agreements restricting the 
right to alienate real property or to make provision for any 
person by will are within the statute of frauds. 
[7] Id. - Estoppel to Assert Statute - Circumstances Creating 
Estoppel- Unjust Enrichment or Unconscionable Injury.-
There was no estoppel to assert the statute of frauds in an 
action involving an alleged oral contract concerning real prop-
erty, where plaintiff did not allege that she would suffer un-
conscionable injury, and it did not appear that others would 
be unjustly enriched, if the oral contract were not enforced. 
[3] See CalJur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 22. 
II c..2d-T 
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APPEAL from an order and a judgment of the Superior 
Court of Sacramento County. William A. White and Albert 
H. Mundt, Judges. Affirmed. 
Proceeding to determine heirship, and action by a widow 
to impose a trust in her favor on her deceased husband's share 
of certain property. Order determining heirship and judgment 
of dismissal of action after demurrer was sustained witbout 
leave to amend affirmed. 
Frank Bottaro, DeCristoforo & DeCristoforo and Joseph 
A. DeCristoforo for Plaintiff and Appellant. . 
John C. Alaimo, George DeLew and E. R. Vaughn for De-
fendants and Respondents, and for Interveners and Respond-
ents. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In these proceedings Marie Baglione, 
the widow of Peter Baglione, seeks to establish her right to 
succeed to certain real property in Peter's estate to the exclu-
sion of the devisees under his will. In a proceeding to deter-
mine heirship, the superior court sitting in probate found that 
the property was the community property of Marie and Peter 
and should be distributed accordingly. It expressly declined to 
consider Marie's claim to the entire property based on an 
alleged contract that she had made with Peter on the ground 
that the superior court sitting in probate had no jurisdiction 
over such a claim. Marie then filed an action against the 
executor of Peter's estate to enforce the alleged contract in 
which Marie and Peter had agreed that the survivor would 
succeed to all property acquired by the parties during the 
marriage. The devisees intervened and joined in the executor's 
demurrer to the complaint. After it was stipulated that the 
alleged contract was oral, the court sustained the demurrer 
without leave to amend and entered judgment dismissing the 
action. Marie appeals from the order of the court sitting in 
probate determining the interests of the parties in the estate 
and from the judgment of dismissal. 
Marie and Peter moved to California from Italy shortly 
after their marriage in 1927. During the marriage both of 
them worked. In 1944 they bought the property in question, a 
tract of land near Lake Tahoe, with accumulated community 
earnings and took title as joint tenants. In 1954 Marie and 
Peter had domestic difficulties. Peter decided to sever the joint 
tenancy and transferred his interest in the Lake Tahoe 
property to one D. Benton who retransferred it to ,Peter. 
.) 
Sept. 1966] ESTATE OF BAGLJONE 
[65 C.2d 192; 53 Cal.Rptr. 139. 417 P.2d 683] 
195 
Marie learned of these transactions soon after they occurred. 
In 1957 Peter filed an action for divorce alleging that the Lake 
Tahoe property was community property. After discussing the 
divorce with an attorney, Marie filed a cross-complaint also 
alleging that the Lake Tahoe property was community 
property. A reconciliation apparently followed, but on 
September 19, 1957, Peter made a will, the provisions of which 
were kne>wn to Marie, leaving his share of the Lake Tahoe 
property to certain named relatives. 
[1] Marie contends that the superior court sitting in pro-
bate erred in finding that both Peter's and her interests in the 
Lake Taboo property were community property. She asserts 
that when Peter severed the joint tenancy in 1954, she took a 
one-half interest as her separate property but that he took his 
one-half interest as community property. There is no merit 
in this contention. If the deed by which Peter and Marie 
took title to the land in joint tenancy reflected their true 
intent, the 1954 conveyances from and to Peter severed the 
. joint tenancy and thereafter the property was held by them as 
·tenants in common. (Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 26 
[13 P.2d 513].) If, despite the form of the original deed, ! 
Peter and Marie intended that the property should be 
community, their intent would control (Tornaier v. Tomaier, 
23 Cal.2d 754, 757 [146 P.2d 905]), and the 1954 conveyances 
would have no legal effect. In either case, Peter and Marie 
could agree after the 1954 conveyances to hold the property as 
community property (Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202, 212 
[259 P.2d 656]), and the trial court's conclusion that they so 
agreed is fully supported by their pleadings in the divorce 
action in which each alleged that the property was com-
munity. 
[2a] Marie contends that the superior court sitting in pro-
bate misconstrued the extent of its powers and should have 
decided whether there was an agreement between her and Peter 
and if so what rights were created by it. She points out that the 
court's finding that the property was community property is 
not inconsistent with the existence of an agreement between 
the spouses to the effect that upon the death of either of them 
all property accumulated during the marriage should go to the 
. survivor. We have concluded that once the court sitting in 
probate determined that Marie was entitled to at least her 
community share of the property, it should also have aeter-
mined any other interests she had in the same property under 
the alleged contract. Since in the subsequent action, however, 
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the superior court correctly concluded that Marie's contract 
claim was barred by the statute of frauds, we hold that she 
was not prejudiced by the court's refusal to consider that 
claim in the probate proceedings. 
[3] As a general rule the jurisdiction of superior couru. 
sitting in probate to administer decedents' estates does no~ 
encompass power to pass upon assertions of title to property 
by parties who are not in privity with the estate but are claim-
ing adversely to it. (Estate of Hart, 51 Ca1.2d 819, 823 [337 
P.2d 73]; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [234 P.2d 
962].) [4] There are, however, several well-recognized 
exceptions to this rule "where a controversy has been held to 
have a sufficient connection with a pending probate proceeding 
to be properly litigated therein. ... " (Oentral Bank v. 
Superior Oourt, 45 Ca1.2d 10, 15 [285 P.2d 906].) The connec· 
tion may arise out of the relationship between the parties. 
Thus the· superior court sitting in probate can adjudicate a 
claim to assets from the estate asserted by an executor or 
administrator in his individual capacity (Schlyen v. Schlyen, 
43 Ca1.2d 361, 372-373 [273 P.2d 897] ; Stevens v. Syperior 
Oourt, 155 Cal. 148, 150-151 [99 P. 512]), and it can deter-
mine whether an assignment or other transfer of the interest 
of an heir, legatee, or devisee to a third party is valid and 
order distribution accordingly. (Prob. Code, §§ 1020, 1020.1; 
Estate of Stanley, 34 Ca1.2d 311,318-319 [209 P.2d 941].) The 
connection may also arise out of the nature of the claim to the 
property. The superior court sitting in probate can determine 
the claim of a surviving wife to her share of the community 
property (Estate of Burdick, 112 Cal. 387. 393-396 [44 P. 
734] ; Oolden v. Oostello, 50 Cal.App.2d 363, 369 [122 P.2d 
959]) or adjudicate a dispute between claimants to property 
"conceded . . . to be or to have been acquired . . . in the 
course of probate proceedings." (0 entral Bank v. Superior 
Court, supra, at p. 16; Estate of De Barry, 43 Cal.App.2d 715, 
725-726 [111 P.2d 728J.) In Woods v. Security-First Nat. 
Bank, 46 Ca1.2d 697 [299 P.2d 657], we recognized a third 
type of exception based on the nature of the claim. and the 
claimant's relationship to the estate. When a party invokes 
the jurisdiction of a court sitting in probate by asserting a 
substantive right in a particular piece of property or in 
certain assets as an heir, legatee, or devisee, he may also obtain 
a judgment in that court determining any additional claims 
that he asserts against those in privity with the estate in the 
same property. (Id. at p. 704; see Estate of Stone, 170 Cal. 
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App.2d 533, 537-539 [339 P.2d 220].) The rationale for this 
exception is the conservation of time, energy, and money of all 
concerned. To deny a superior court sitting in probate the 
power to determine the whole controversy between the parties 
before it is pointless. [5] In the exercise of its legal and 
equitable powers (see Schlyen v. Schlyen, supra, at p. 371; 
Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 139 [204 P. 583]), a superior 
court sitting in probate that has jurisdiction over one aspect 
of a claim to certain property can determine all aspects of the 
claim. A claimant is not required to sever and litigate a multi-
faceted claim in separate proceedings once all the necessary 
parties are before the court. Thus in the instant case, once the 
court determined that Marie had a community interest in the 
Lake Tahoe property subject to probate, it should have 
resolved the entire controversy and determined her rights to 
that property under the alleged oral agreement with the 
deceased. Any statements in Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Ca1.2d 799 
[26 Cal. Rptr. 635, 376 P.2d 563], and Smith v. Smith, 220' 
Ca1.App.2d 30 [33 Ca1.Rptr. 559], to the contrary are dis-
approved. 
[2b] The court's error in refusing to entertain Marie's 
contract claim in the probate proceedings was made harmless, 
however, once the superior court, in the exercise of its general 
equity powers, took jurisdiction over and passed on the claim 
in a separate action. In that action Marie alleged in substance 
that she and Peter orally agreed throughout their marriage 
that all property acquired by them would be held in such a 
manner that on the death of one the survivor would succeed to 
it and that Peter breached this agreement by severing the joint 
tenancy and executing a will naming his relatives as devisees. 
[6] Agreements restricting the right to alienate real 
property or to make provision for any person by will are 
within the statute of frauds. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1091, 1624, 
subds. 4, 6; Code Civ. Proc., § 1971; Cottom v. Bennett, 214 
Cal.App.2d 709, 717 [29 Cal.Rptr. 715] ; Pellerito v. Dragna, 
41 Cal.App.2d 85, 89 [105 P.2d 1011].) [7] Marie con-
tends, however, that she has alleged sufficient facts to estop 
the executor and devisees from relying on the statute of_ 
frauds. There is no estoppel unless :6farie would suffer uncon-
scionable injury or the devisees would be unjustly enriched if 
the oral contract were not enforced. (Ruinello v. Murray, 36 
Cal.2d 687, 689 [227 P.2d 251]; Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 
Ca1.2d 621, 623-624 [220 P.2d 737], and cases cited.) "The 
doctrine of estoppel has been applied where an unconscionable 
) 
) 
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injury would result from denying enforcement after one party 
has been induced to make a serious change of position in reli-
ance on the contract or where unjust enrichment would result 
if a party who has received the benefits of the other's 
performallce were allowed to invoke the statute." (Day v. 
Greene, 59 CaL2d 404, 410 [29 Cal.Rptr. 785, 380 P.2d 385, 94 
A.L.R.2d 802].) Marie has not alleged any serious change of 
position in reliance on the contract or that her contributions to 
the community earnings were different from those that she 
would have made in any event as Peter's wife. (Cf., Monarco 
v. Lo Greco, 35 Ca1.2d 621, 624 [220 P.2d 737].) Her injury is 
merely the loss of the benefit of a bargain within the statute. 
Nor will the devisees be unjustly enriched if the contract is 
not enforced. They take through Peter, and since he died first, 
he received no benefits under the contract. (Cf. Day v. Greene, 
59 Ca1.2d 404, 410-411 [29 Cal.Rptr. 785, 380 P.2d 385, 94 
A.L.R.2d 802] ; Notten v. Mensing, 3 Ca1.2d 469, 474 [45 P.2d 
198].) Equity" will not enforce an oral agreement within the 
statute of frauds solely because not to do so would permit a 
defendant to assert the statute and thus avoid the parol obli-
gation." (Beazell v. Schrader, 59 Ca1.2d 577, 582 [30 Cal.. 
Rptr. 534, 381 P.2d 390] ; Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 85 
[193 P. 84J.) Since at no time during these proceedings has 
Marie indicated any basiR on which an estoppel to assert the 
statute of frauds could be predicated, the trial court did not 
err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. 
The judgment of dismissal and the order determining heir-
ship are affirmed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobril1er, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
